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Abstract 
 
The concept of diversity has become increasingly salient in equality discourse. In 
the EU and in many of its member states, the term ‘diversity’ is now often used 
in place of ‘equality’ by advocates of voluntarist antidiscrimination policies. This 
trend echoes a phenomenon observable in the United States, where the notion of 
diversity has acquired a major place in discussions over affirmative action. 
Interestingly, the US Supreme Court has played an important role in this 
evolution: ‘promotion of diversity’ has progressively become almost the sole 
justification admitted for affirmative action programmes in higher education. 
This paper critically explores the use of diversity argument in US legal discourse 
on antidiscrimination. It argues that while the notion of diversity may valuably 
contribute to the promotion of equal opportunities, it is not without ambiguities. 
A first ambiguity results from the vagueness of the term “diversity.” Considered 
in the abstract, it may encompass all kind of differences and particularities. 
Absent further explanation, it is not self-evident that “achieving diversity” 
requires a special focus on disadvantaged racial or ethnic minorities. The second 
ambiguity lies with the fact that the diversity argument, as constructed in the US 
case law, tends to justify efforts to promote the inclusion of disadvantaged 
groups on the basis of its utility for the dominant majority. This line of argument 
may obfuscate more principled justifications and makes equality discourse more 
vulnerable to attacks based on claims that combating discrimination is in fact 
not “efficient” and thus not in the interest of the dominant majority. 
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Diversity and Equality: An Ambiguous Relationship. 
Reflections on the US Case Law on Affirmative 
Action in Higher Education
1
Julie Ringelheim  
 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years, the concept of diversity has undergone a remarkable rise in 
equality discourse. It has become a major component of the rhetorical 
apparatus of advocates of voluntarist antidiscrimination policies. It sometimes 
even tends to be used in place of the word ‘equality.’ Measures adopted by 
governments or private actors to promote access of disadvantaged minorities’ 
members to higher education, employment or other areas of social life, are 
often described today as aiming at ‘enhancing’ or ‘achieving diversity’.
2 Such 
language is now common within the European Union institutions as well as in 
many of its member states. Interestingly, ‘diversity talk’ is also on the rise in 
France, a country traditionally opposed to the recognition of ethnic 
minorities, and which remains attached to the idea that the norm of equality 
prohibits the taking into account of religious, ethnic or other differences in 
any circumstance. Phrases like ‘reflecting the diversity of the French society’ 
or the ‘French population’ in the public service,
3 in private companies
4 or in 
 
 
1   This paper was first presented at a conference organized by the Council of Europe at the European 
Youth Center in Strasbourg on 11-13 May 2006, on “Diversity, Human Rights, Participation”. I thank 
all the participants to the conference for the helpful comments. The paper will be published in 
Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley (eds.), Diversity, Human Rights and Participation (Council of Europe 
Publishing, Strasbourg (forthcoming)).  
2    For instance, plans adopted by companies to combat internal discriminatory practices and 
encourage recruitment of members of disadvantaged minorities are commonly called either 
“diversity plans” or “equality plans”. See European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (Unit D3), “The Business Case for Diversity: 
Good Practices in the Workplace”, September 2005. 
3   See Gwenaële Calvès, “‘Reflecting the diversity of the French Population’: Birth and Development 
of a Fuzzy Concept”, 183 International Social Science Journal (2005), 165-174. See also the 
arguments put forward to justify the special selection process established by the French Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques ( IEP or Science-Po) in order to foster the admission of candidates from 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, inhabited mainly by persons with an immigrant background: Daniel 
Sabbagh, “Affirmative Action at Sciences Po”, 20(3) French Politics, Culture & Society (2002), 
52-64. The very title of the programme is “Conventions ZEP: l’excellence dans la diversité” 
(excellence in diversity) (see Sabbagh, “Affirmative Action at Sciences Po”…, at 57).  
4   The “Charter for diversity” (Charte de la diversité), launched in 2004 under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Interior, has been signed by 250 companies in the public and private sectors. The 
signatories pledge to “respect and promote the principle of non-discrimination in recruitment and 
promotion, in order to reflect the diversity of the French society, including cultural and ethnic 
diversity, in their workforce, […] at the different levels of qualifications.” (“…  respecter et 
promouvoir l’application du principe de non-discrimination pour l’embauche, la formation, 
l’avancement ou la promotion professionnelle,” afin de “refléter la diversité de la société 
française, notamment culturelle et ethnique, dans leurs effectifs […], aux différents niveaux de 
qualification.” (Le Monde, 10 November 2005, at 3).) 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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the media,
5 are now widely used in political language, although their concrete 
implications remain somewhat vague.
6  
The inflation of diversity talk in Europe echoes – and maybe results from – a 
similar trend observable in the United States. In the case of the US, the notion 
of diversity has acquired a major place not only in political debates but also in 
legal discussions, more especially in relation to affirmative action, in 
particular in higher education. To be sure, the terms ‘affirmative action’ 
designate a special kind of antidiscrimination policies, which involves 
preferential treatment of persons belonging to disadvantaged groups or 
women in hiring, admission to universities or government contracting.
7 
However, the development of the diversity concept in this regard carries more 
general lessons as to the relations between diversity, equality and 
antidiscrimination. 
This article thus proposes to explore how the diversity argument emerged 
in the US legal discourse on antidiscrimination policies, how it was 
constructed, and how it operates. It will focus on the promotion of minorities’ 
access to higher education, since it is primarily in relation to higher education 
that the diversity argument has been developed in the US case law. The 
discussion will be limited to the issue of racial or ethnic minorities. Although 
the term ‘diversity’ is used today, depending on the context, to refer to the 
struggle against all kinds of discrimination, whether the basis of the 
discrimination is ethnic or racial origin, gender, religion, disability or sexual 
orientation, in fat, racial or ethnic minorities are the only groups concerned 
by affirmative action policies in US universities.  
Given the high level of sophistication attained by the US debate 
surrounding the theme of ‘diversity in higher education’, these controversies 
can cast important light on the implications of the diversity argument for 
equality and the fight against discrimination. The notion of diversity may 
appear, at first sight, as an inherently positive one or, at least, as completely 
innocuous. Yet, as will be shown in this paper, a close analysis of the way this 
notion has been shaped and understood by the US Supreme Court highlights 
some of its potential ambiguities and downsides from the perspective of 
equality. 
 
 
5   The recent law on ‘égalite des chances’ (equal opportunities), adopted on 31 March 2006, provides, 
under the heading “actions in favor of social cohesion and the struggle against discrimination in 
broadcasting”, that the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel” (High Broadcasting Council) shall ensure 
that radio and television programmes “reflect the diversity of the French society” (Loi n. 2006-396 
du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalite des chances, J.O., 2 April 2006, Article 47).  
6   Calvès, “‘Reflecting the Diversity …”. 
7   See Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry 
(Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1991), at 47; Samuel Leiter and William M. Leiter, 
Affirmative Action in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy: An Overview and Synthesis (State 
University of New York Press, New York, 2002), at 1. 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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The paper starts with a brief description of relevant US case law (part 2). It 
then considers two main ambiguities of diversity as a justification for special 
admission policies in universities. The first results from the vagueness of the 
term ‘diversity’. Considered in the abstract, it may encompass all kind of 
differences and particularities. In consequence, absent further explanation, it 
is not self-evident that ‘achieving diversity’ in higher education requires a 
special focus on racial or ethnic features more than on other specificities 
(part 3). The second ambiguity lies with the fact that the diversity argument, 
as constructed in the US case law, tends to justify efforts to promote the 
inclusion of disadvantaged groups on the basis of its utility for the dominant 
majority, rather than as a matter of justice or moral obligation. Convincing 
the overall society that it should support the promotion of equal opportunities 
is no doubt important. But this line of argument may obfuscate more 
principled justifications and makes equality discourse more vulnerable to 
attacks based on claims that combating discrimination is not ‘efficient’ and 
thus not in the interest of the dominant majority after all (part 4). 
2. Diversity in US Case Law 
The diversity argument emerged in the US Supreme Court case law in Regents 
of California v. Bakke (1978).
8 The case was brought by an unsuccessful white 
applicant to the Davis Medical School of the University of California, who 
challenged the school’s special admission programme, designed to increase 
the number of minority students. Under this programme, minority candidates 
were evaluated separately, and sixteen of the one hundred places in the 
entering class were reserved for minority students. Alan Bakke claimed that 
he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race because some 
minority applicants had been admitted to the school through the special 
programme with grade point averages significantly lower than his.
9  
The central issue for the Court to decide was whether, under the 14th 
Amendment of the US Constitution, which prohibits states from denying any 
person the equal protection of the laws, governments may use race-conscious 
measures to redress the continuing effects of past discrimination. The Court 
revealed itself to be deeply divided. Four judges took the view that the 
race-conscious admission programme of Davis Medical School was 
constitutional because it was aimed at “remedying the effects of past societal 
discrimination” in a situation where there was “a sound basis for concluding 
that minority under representation [was] substantial and chronic and caused 
 
 
8   Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
9   He argued that the school’s admission policy contravened Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibits discrimination in education, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of 
the US Constitution. 
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by past discrimination […].”
10 By contrast, four other judges concluded that 
the policy was discriminatory and that the plaintiff should be admitted to the 
Medical School.
11 The last judge, Justice Powell, took a middle-ground 
position. He agreed with the ‘conservative’ judges that the specific 
programme in use at Davis was illegal because of its rigidity: a fixed number 
of places were reserved for candidates from designated ethnic or racial 
groups. But he concurred with the ‘liberal’ judges in considering that, as a 
general matter, universities can have a legitimate interest in taking race or 
ethnicity into account in the admission process. Importantly, he was the only 
judge to discuss the Medical School’s argument that a university may consider 
race in the selection of applicants in order to achieve a diverse student body. 
He agreed with this argument: obtaining diversity within a student body is a 
legitimate goal for a higher education institution that could justify, under 
certain limitations, some form of preferential treatment. “The atmosphere of 
‘speculation, experiment and creation’ – so essential to the quality of higher 
education – is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body […]. 
[I]t is not too much to say that the ‘Nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and more of students as diverse 
as this Nation of many peoples.”
12 Thus, the right of universities “to select 
those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of 
ideas’” constitutes a countervailing constitutional interest, and is necessary to 
enable them to pursue a goal of paramount importance in the fulfilment of 
their mission.
13  
Given the split among the judges in Bakke, uncertainty and disagreement 
arose in the following years among courts and commentators as to the legal 
value to be attributed to the diversity rationale. In Hopwood v. Texas (1996), 
a Court of Appeal concluded that Bakke was not a controlling precedent 
because no other judge had joined Justice Powell in his reliance on the notion 
of diversity. The Hopwood  Court therefore held that diversity was not a 
compelling state interest justifying consideration for racial or ethnic features 
in university admission and declared the affirmative action programme in 
place at the University of Texas Law School to be unconstitutional.
14 The 
 
 
10   Opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part, at 362. 
11   Opinion of Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which 
Justices Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined, at 408-421. 
12   Bakke, at 312-313. 
13   Bakke, at 313. Nonetheless, in the specific case at stake, he found that the programme established 
by the Davis Medical School was not a necessary means to that end, in particular because it included 
rigid quota, rather than an individualised consideration of each applicant’s background and 
potential to contribute to the diversity of the student’s body. 
14   Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d, at 932, 944 and 962 (5
th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court refused to grant 
certiorari, which means that it declined reviewing the Court of Appeal’s judgment. On the Hopwood 
decision and the reactions to it, see Marcia G. Synnott, “The Evolving Diversity Rationale in 
University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University of Michigan Cases”, 90 Cornell Law 
Review (2005), 463-504, at 476-478. For a defence of the diversity rationale as a matter of US Equal 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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Supreme Court clarified the matter in two 2003 major decisions – Grutter v. 
Bollinger
15 and Gratz v. Bollinger.
16 This time, a majority of 5 judges expressly 
endorsed Justice Powell’s proposition that universities can consider race or 
ethnicity in admission process if their purpose is to achieve a diverse student 
body. The present stance of the US Supreme Court is, therefore, that diversity 
does constitute a compelling state interest justifying race-conscious admission 
programmes in higher education institutions.
17  
The importance acquired by the notion of diversity within the US Supreme 
Court jurisprudence may be partly due to the influence of notions such as 
multiculturalism, identity recognition and valuing differences, which became 
increasingly popular in the 1980s and 1990s. However, in order to grasp the 
real significance of this evolution, it must be emphasised that the diversity 
argument became increasingly prominent in legal and political debates in a 
period in which most of the other justifications for affirmative action 
measures were progressively invalidated by the Supreme Court. Remedying 
the effects of past societal discrimination, ensuring distributive justice for 
certain disadvantaged groups in the present,
18 or providing role models for 
members of disadvantaged minorities,
19 were all discarded as not constituting 
compelling state interests justifying race-conscious measures.
20 In effect, 
‘diversity’ became almost the sole permissible justification for affirmative 
action programmes in higher education.
21 J. M. Balkin observes that “[t]hese 
 
 
Protection doctrine, see Goodwin Liu, “Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity 
Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test”, 33 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 
(1998), 381-442. 
15   Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 U.S., at 321-322 (concerning the constitutionality of the University 
of Michigan Law School’s admission policy).  
16   Gratz v. Bollinger et al., 539 U.S., at 267-270 (concerning the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan’s College of Literature, Science & the Arts’ admission policy). 
17   Previously, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C. (110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990)) a majority of the Supreme 
Court had already upheld the diversity rationale for race-conscious policies in the context of 
broadcasting. Increasing broadcast diversity was deemed to be an important governmental interest, 
justifying race-conscious policies. On the significance of Metro Broadcasting, see Patricia Williams, 
“Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times”, 104 Harvard Law Review (1990), 
525-546; and Sheila Foster, “Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of 
‘Diversity’”, 1 Wisconsin Law Review (1993), 105-161. 
18   Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-307 (Powell, J.’s Opinion). See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
476 U.S. at 276 (“Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a 
racially classified remedy”).  
19   Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. at 275-276. In this decision, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the notion that providing role models for the increasing proportion of Black students in a 
school could justify a race-conscious plan aimed at increasing the number of teachers from various 
racial and ethnic backgrounds.  
20   The scope of permissible affirmative action measures has been further limited in Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny – rather than the milder criteria of 
intermediate scrutiny - must apply to all race-based measures used by state and local governments, 
even when such measures aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination) and Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (extending the strict scrutiny rule to federal race-
based classifications).  
21   The other situation where the US Supreme Court admits the validity of affirmative action is where it 
is proved that the concerned institution or company has been specifically responsible for 
identifiable past discrimination against a favored group, that this discrimination continues to affect 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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precedents had “discourse shaping” or “discourse forcing” effects. If state 
governments wanted to practice race-conscious affirmative action, they had 
to speak in certain ways. […] Thus, the rules in place forced university 
administrators to speak the language of diversity.”
22  
As a matter of fact, grounding affirmative action on the objective of 
achieving ‘a diverse student body’ presents several advantages. ‘Diversity’ 
generally resonates positively in the overall public. It fits with classical liberal 
values of pluralism, freedom of speech, and tolerance. In addition, the 
diversity argument eschews the two major objections raised against 
affirmative action: first, that it distorts the meritocratic character of the 
selection process by favouring certain people on the basis of factors irrelevant 
to school performance; second, that it unfairly discriminates against members 
of non-disadvantaged groups.
23 The diversity-based justification, as 
constructed by Justice Powell, recharacterises affirmative action as a means 
to achieve “an end internal to the enterprise of education – rather than as a 
technique for promoting a redistributive goal external to it”.
24 It rests on the 
premise that interaction with people with different ideas, experiences, 
outlooks, or ways of life, contributes to the education of students. This has 
two implications. First, it suggests that the applicants’ racial or ethnic 
background is, in truth, a relevant factor from an educational perspective. 
Second, it entails that the benefit of diversity-enhancing policies in university 
admission is not limited to minority applicants. Non-minority candidates with 
special talents or experiences, may also be deemed likely to foster diversity. 
Seen in this light, the possibility to take racial or ethnic origins into account in 
admission is less likely to appear as an exception to the rule or as a form of 
privilege. Moreover, the diversity argument implies that inclusion of 
minorities in higher education institutions is a good not just for minorities 
themselves, but for the whole student community, and in particular for 
members of the dominant majority. However, as we shall see in the two next 
sections, these advantages also have their flipsides.  
 
 
individual victims, and that the programme is carefully tailored to remedy this particular wrong. 
See e.g. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 
777 (1976). See inter alia J ac k M . Bal kin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts”, 
26 Cardozo Law Review (2005), 1689-1730; Trina Jones, “The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic 
Solution”, 1 Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties (2005), 171-215, at 175; Peter Schuck 
“Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future”, 26 Yale Law & Policy Review (2002), 1-92; Samuel 
Issacharoff, “Law and Misdirection in the Debate over Affirmative Action”, University of Chicago 
Legal Forum (2002), 11-43, at 16-17; Stanford Levinson, “Diversity”, 2 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law (2000), 573-608, at 577.  
22   Balkin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter …”, at 1722. On the same note, Jones writes: “Because civil 
rights advocates were left with few legal grounds upon which to rest their efforts to eliminate 
discrimination, they strategically and quite pragmatically climbed onto the diversity bandwagon.” 
(Jones, “The Diversity Rationale…”, at 175). See also Schuck, “Affirmative Action …”, at 34-35. 
23   See Anthony T. Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?”, 52(5) Florida Law 
Review (2000), 861-894, at 865-867. 
24   Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value …”, at 865. 
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3. Diversity of what? 
The notion of diversity, without further specification, can refer to all kinds of 
differences, traits, or attributes.
25 It does not, in and by itself, connote the 
inclusion of the members of discriminated groups; it is potentially much 
larger. The concept’s appeal is probably partly due to its vagueness, which 
enables various people to infuse it with different meanings. However, when 
the concern is to enhance minorities’ access to universities, resorting to the 
diversity argument begs the question: how do we explain that a policy 
supposedly aimed at fostering diversity in higher education should focus on 
racial and ethnic particularities, rather than on other characteristics? Why 
should these features especially matter to an educational institution more 
than, for instance, religious or ideological differences?
26  
3.1. Diversity as an Internal Educational Good 
The specificity of the diversity rationale, compared with other types of 
justification for affirmative action, lies with the fact that it justifies 
race-conscious measures as a means to achieve a good internal to universities, 
an ‘internal educational good’, as A. T. Kronman puts it, rather than an 
external goal, such as promoting social justice.
27 As construed by Justice 
Powell and his followers, the argument is based on the claim that universities 
can legitimately consider that enhancing diversity contributes to their 
educational mission. Creating a stimulating environment, propitious to 
teaching and learning, is part of colleges’ and universities’ fundamental tasks. 
A diverse students body, with a plurality of ‘experiences, talents, and 
viewpoints’, helps create such a stimulating atmosphere, conductive to a 
“robust exchange of ideas.”
28 And, as the argument goes, minority students 
bring with them special perspectives, of which other students may benefit. 
However, both Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor insist that ‘diversity’ 
should not be limited to ethnic or racial diversity. “Ethnic diversity […] is only 
one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in 
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”
29 Powell criticises the 
Davis Medical School’s programme for being concerned exclusively with ethnic 
or racial features. “The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest 
 
 
25   Levinson, “Diversity” …, at 578-579. 
26   See Eugene Volokh, “Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy”, 43 UCLA Law Review (1996), 
2059-2076; Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value …”, at 877-884; Foster, “Difference and Equality …”, 
at 139-140.  
27   On the distinction between “internal” and “external” goal, see Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value …”, 
at 867. For a careful discussion of the argument that racial and ethnic diversity promotes an 
educational good: see Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value …”. For a critical analysis of this argument, 
see George Sher, “Diversity”, 28(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs (1999), 85-104. 
28   See Bakke, Opinion of Justice Powell, at 313. 
29   Bakke, at 314. 
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encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial and ethnic origin is but a single though important element.” In his 
opinion, focusing solely on ethnic diversity hinders rather than furthers 
attainment of “genuine diversity.”
30 By contrast, he mentions approvingly the 
admission system in place at Harvard College, where race or ethnic 
background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, without 
this factor being decisive when compared with other qualities likely to 
promote educational pluralism, such as “exceptional personal talents, unique 
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated 
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate 
with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”
31
On a similar note, Justice O’Connor, in her opinion in Grutter, praises the 
fact that Michigan Law School “engages in a highly individualized, holistic 
review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an 
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.
”32 In other 
words, a policy designed to promote diversity in higher education should 
neither automatically nor exclusively benefit members of disadvantaged racial 
or ethnic minorities. It should be devised so as to include all kinds of 
characteristics likely to enhance a diverse educational environment.  
This reasoning, despite its egalitarian appeal, is not without problems. It 
raises at least two difficulties: one can be termed the risk of dilution, the 
other, the risk of essentialisation.  
The first problem with this argument is that it dilutes the attention 
afforded to the disadvantaged minority background of certain applicants into 
a broader and vaguer interest in all sorts of differences. It conflates various 
types of diversities – ‘ideological diversity’, ‘experiential diversity’, ‘diversity 
of talents’, and ‘demographic diversity’.
33 Ethnic or racial differences are 
melt among a large array of experiences and particularities that universities 
may take into account in the admission process. As a consequence, the 
particular significance of ethnic or racial origins becomes more elusive. “By 
treating all differences the same, [the concept of diversity as constructed in 
Bakke] ignores the ‘salience’ of certain differences in this society by 
extracting differences from their socio-political contexts.”
34 Now, the more 
the fact of belonging to a disadvantaged minority is assimilated to other kinds 
of characteristics likely to produce various viewpoints and perspectives, the 
 
 
30   Bakke, at 315. 
31   Bakke, at 316-317. What is particularly important for Powell is that the admission programme 
should be flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity and not isolate any 
individual applicants from comparison with others. (Bakke, at 316-317).  
32   Grutter. 
33   On these distinctions, Balkin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter …”, at 1722-1723. 
34   Foster, “Difference and Equality …”, at 111. See also her observations at 130-138. 
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more difficult it becomes to explain why diversity-policy in universities should 
particularly focus on specific ethnic or racial groups, or even why it should 
include them at all. Indeed, Hopwood v. Texas illustrates that the argument 
for educational diversity can be endorsed, while excluding ethnic or racial 
differences from its scope. The majority in Hopwood struck down the Texas 
Law School affirmative action policy, holding that the use of “ethnic 
diversity” to achieve “racial heterogeneity” was unconstitutional.
35 Yet, at 
the same time, it stated that universities could legitimately take into account 
a host of other factors in the admission process, like the ability to play the 
cello, make a downfield tackle, understand chaos theory, or even an 
applicant’s home state or relationship to school alumni.
36 It simply observed 
t h a t  “ ‘ d i v e r s i t y ’  c a n  t a k e  m a n y  f o r m s .  T o  f o s t e r  s u c h  d i v e r s i t y ,  s t a t e  
universities and law schools and other governmental entities must scrutinize 
applicants individually, rather than resorting to the dangerous proxy of race.” 
The judge writing for the majority went on to argue that the plaintiff herself 
was a good example of an applicant with a unique background: as the wife of 
a military and the mother of a severely handicapped child, she could have 
brought a ‘different perspective’ to the law school.
37
To counter the Hopwood logic and justify the special consideration 
afforded to ethnic or racial background in selection process, while remaining 
in line with Justice Powell’s approach, the advocates of the diversity rationale 
must insist that minority applicants contribute to the diversification of 
educational environment because they bring special perspectives and 
viewpoints. But this claim, in turn, raises another problem. The correlation it 
posits between a person’s racial or ethnic background and her outlooks, ideas, 
or values is highly contentious. It may be criticised as suggesting that one 
‘essential’ minority viewpoint exists, thus reifying the groups concerned and 
neglecting their internal diversity. Furthermore, the assumption of a strong 
link between one’s racial or ethnic origins and one’s values or way of thinking 
creates the risk of reinforcing racial prejudice and stereotyping.
38   
3.2. Diversity in Context: Back to Racism and Discrimination 
These two problems – that of dilution and that of essentialisation – reveal a 
fundamental weakness in the argument elaborated by Justice Powell: The 
mere objective of enhancing the diversity of viewpoints and conceptions 
 
 
35   Hopwood, 78 F.3d, at 945. 
36   Hopwood, at 946. Thus, the policy of Texas Law School to set aside 80 % of seats for residents of 
Texas and to favour children of alumni was safe from attack, while the affirmative action 
programme aimed at promoting access of minorities was deemed unconstitutional. 
37   Hopwood, at 946.  
38   See Schuck, “Affirmative Action …”, at 41; Foster, “Difference and Equality …”, at 138-139; Volokh, 
“Diversity, Race as Proxy …”, at 2060-2061. See also Daniel Sabbagh, L’égalité par le droit – Les 
paradoxes de la discrimination positive aux Etats-Unis (Economica, Paris, 2003), at 246-249. 
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represented in universities is not, as such, a sufficient argument to justify the 
special weight assigned to racial or ethnic features. Explaining why ethnic or 
racial diversity should matter to educational institutions, without resorting to 
essentialist assumptions about the existence of a ‘Black’ or ‘Hispanic’ 
viewpoint, requires going beyond a narrow conception of educational 
diversity, that is limited to the rather uncontroversial claim that students 
should be confronted to a multiplicity of opinions and ideas. It is necessary to 
first acknowledge the specific social context that gives racial or ethnic 
features their particular salience. In other words, the notion of diversity must 
be interpreted in the light of the social environment in which differences are 
constructed and exist. And this context is one that is characterised by past 
and continuing racism and discrimination.
39 The experience that minority 
youths therefore have in common is that of growing up as members of a group 
that, in the society in which they live, is racialised and discriminated against. 
This specific life experience may lead them to have different perspectives on 
certain issues than other students, who have not been personally exposed to 
racist attitudes, disadvantage or exclusion. To this extent, they may provide a 
special viewpoint on the society, on its dominant habits and patterns of 
thought.
40 There is at least a probability that they will be deeply interested 
and somewhat knowledgeable in certain issues. Moreover, given their internal 
knowledge of the groups concerned, they are also likely to be aware of the 
complexities and internal divisions of the group they are associated with.
41 
Accordingly, the inclusion of a minimum of applicants with a minority 
background in universities allows other students to get a better understanding 
of the problems of racism and exclusion. Furthermore, by providing young 
p eo p le wit h  d ifferen t  racial o r et h n ic backgrounds with the opportunity to 
interact with each other, it helps breaking down stereotypes and fostering 
inter-community understanding.
42  
This concern, while absent from Justice Powell’s analysis in Bakke, surfaces 
in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter. She stresses that the contested 
Michigan Law School admission policy “promotes cross-racial understanding, 
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.”
43 She also endorses the Michigan Law 
School’s argument that it needs a ‘critical mass’ of minority students: given 
 
 
39   See Foster, “Difference and Equality …”, esp. at 110-111; Elizabeth Anderson, “Integration, 
Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny”, 77 NYU Law Review (2002), 1195-1271; Charles R. 
Lawrence III, “Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning”, 31 University of San Francisco 
Law Review (1997), 757-778. 
40   Anderson, “Integration, Affirmative Action …”, at 1222-1223; Lawrence III, “Each Other’s 
Harvest …”, at 774; Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige, “Affirmative Action for Whom?”, 47 Stanford 
Law Review (1995), 855-900, at 862; Foster, “Difference and Equality …”. For a close discussion of 
this argument, see Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value …”, at 879-884. 
41   Levinson, “Diversity” …, at 597. 
42   Anderson, “Integration, Affirmative Action …”, at 1223. 
43   Grutter, at 328. 
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its rejection of the view that minority students would express some 
characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue, the law school argued that it 
could not accomplish the goal of weakening the force of stereotypes – a goal 
Justice O’Connor considers to be a crucial part of the Law School’s mission – 
with only token numbers of minority students. It therefore needed a ‘critical 
mass’ of underrepresented minorities in order to secure the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.
44
However, this line of thought implies a departure from the claim that the 
inclusion of minority students is merely aimed at contributing to the creation 
of an intellectually stimulating environment. It rests upon an expanded 
conception of the educational goals at stake, that encompasses the objective 
of eliminating racist prejudice and attitudes.
45 But once we acknowledge that 
attention to racial or ethnic origins in university admission is justified by the 
need to combat racism, considering only the educational benefit that the 
presence of minority youth in universities and colleges would bring to the 
student community, appears strikingly narrow. What seems primarily 
important from the perspective of fighting racism and its consequences, 
namely discrimination and disadvantage, is to enhance the very access of 
minorities to higher education from which they continue to be 
disproportionately excluded.
46
Eradicating racial prejudice other students may hold appears as one 
component of a much larger enterprise, that goes beyond the limits of the 
university: that of deracialising the society and promoting equal opportunities 
for all.
47 As S. Foster puts it, “the value of diversity is not only in the diverse 
viewpoints that individuals from different backgrounds may contribute to an 
institution but, more importantly, the inclusion and participation of 
individuals from groups that are systematically excluded and disempowered 
on all levels of society.”
48 Indeed, “maintaining a ‘mix’ of differences, merely 
for the sake of sheer diversity, fails to promote equality in a society where 
certain differences have been constructed into a basis for systematic 
exclusion and disadvantage […].”
49
 
 
44   Ibid. 
45   See Anderson, “Integration, Affirmative Action …”, at 1222. 
46   Jones, “The Diversity Rationale …”, at 179. 
47   See Levinson, “Diversity” …; Foster, “Difference and Equality …”. 
48   Foster, “Difference and Equality …”, at 141. She adds that: “The prospective value of diversity 
should be in the inclusion and participation of formerly excluded groups so as to empower those 
individuals to decide and define for themselves what outlooks and viewpoints they will have.” 
(ibid.). 
49   Foster, “Difference and Equality …”, at 137. 
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4. Diversity for what Purpose? 
The diversity argument for special admission policies in universities in favour 
of ethnic or racial minorities, presents a further ambiguity. As elaborated by 
Justice Powell, diversity is presented as being a good primarily for the 
dominant majority.
50 Its main aim is supposed to be the improvement of the 
education of the American elite. Both Powell and O’Connor emphasise that 
the presence of minority students, with their special viewpoints and 
experiences, will enhance the education of the “future leaders of the 
Nation”; interacting with people of a minority background should enlarge 
their knowledge of the world and the society, and better prepare them to 
their tasks as professionals. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, was manifestly 
impressed by the large number of amicus briefs filed by other elite 
universities and around 500 companies, as well as by high-ranking military 
officers, that emphasised the importance of ethnic and racial diversity in the 
academy, in the workplace, and in the army. She notes that, according to 
numerous studies, a diverse student body promotes learning outcomes and 
“better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society.” 
She further stresses that “major American businesses have made clear that 
the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be 
developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and 
viewpoints.”
 51 More importantly in her eyes, high-ranking retired officers and 
civilian leaders of the US military assert that a “highly qualified, racially 
diverse officer corps […] is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its 
principle mission to provide national security.”
52
Remarkably, the argument in favour of special admission policies in 
universities is here completely detached from a reflection on the causes of 
the difficulties minority youth encounter in accessing higher education. This 
certainly contributes to the diversity rationale’s appeal in the general public. 
E. Volokh aptly points out that “[d]iversity is particularly appealing because 
[…] it’s forward-looking; it ascribes no guilt, calls for no argument about 
compensation. It seems to ask simply for rational, unbigoted judgment […].”
53 
To be sure, convincing members of the dominant groups that they can benefit 
from the inclusion of disadvantaged groups in education or employment, is 
undeniably important. However, presenting the supposed benefits for the 
dominant majority as the main and primary justification for such policy is not 
 
 
50   See Schuck, “Affirmative Action …”, at 34. 
51   Grutter, at 330-332. See also Justice Powell: “[I]t is not too much to say that the ‘nation’s future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and more of students as diverse 
as this Nation of many peoples.” (Bakke, at 312-313). 
52   Grutter, at 332. 
53   Volokh, “Diversity, Race as Proxy …”, at 2060.  
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without cost. It is a double-edged strategy. On the one hand, it may facilitate 
its acceptance by the majority. But on the other hand, it renders the policies 
at issue more vulnerable to empirically-based argument that would tend to 
show that promoting diversity does not, in practice, produce the benefits it is 
said to bring. Indeed, it might be possible to find empirical evidence 
indicating that racial or ethnic diversity does not always promote educational 
excellence or efficiency.
54 Mixing people with different backgrounds is not 
necessarily a smooth process; it might create tensions and difficulties within 
the student communities.
55 Thus, as S. Levinson notes, “[s]elf-regarding 
arguments have the advantage of appearing more hard-headed and less 
idealistic; they may, for better and worse, however, be subject to more 
stringent empirical tests than are public-regarding arguments that forthrightly 
admit that costs may have to be paid in order to achieve desirable social 
goals.”
56
At this point, the basic question to ask is: Whether or not promoting racial 
or ethnic diversity advances the interest of the majority, aren’t there more 
fundamental reasons to support policies aiming at this objective, regardless of 
their practical benefits? Aren’t there any normative principle, independent of 
empirical evidence, that justifies or requires efforts in this direction? This 
question takes us back to the conclusion in the previous section: for diversity 
to remain a compelling argument in favour of the inclusion of minorities in 
higher education, it must remain closely linked to the principle and ideal of 
equality.
57 For Ch. Lawrence, diversity cannot be an end in itself because it 
has no inherent meaning and cannot be a compelling interest “unless we ask 
 
 
54   See the observations of Levinson, “Diversity” …, at 588-592. A related objection that is sometimes 
raised is that in certain fields, like mathematics or physics, racial or ethnic diversity seems largely 
irrelevant to the goals of education. See Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value …”, at 869. 
55    Plausibly, “just as there are practical benefits to diversity, there may be practical benefits to 
uniformity. In some situations, teams may work better if their members share the same 
experiences, outlooks, and ideas. Uniformity has its costs, but reasonable, unprejudiced people can 
conclude that it can sometimes also have its benefits.” (Volokh, “Diversity, Race as Proxy …”, 
at 2061-2062).  
56   Levinson, “Diversity” …, at 592. 
57   In fact, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter alludes to the idea of equal opportunity, but her 
discussion is confused by the fact that she mixes the theme of equality with other types of 
arguments. Recalling that the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that education is the 
very foundation of good citizenship, she infers from there that access to knowledge and opportunity 
provided by higher education institutions must be open to all regardless of race or ethnicity. 
“Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of the Nation is 
essential to achieve the unity and indivisibility of the Nation.” (Grutter, at 332). She adds a further 
argument, based on the notion of legitimacy: given that universities, and law schools in particular, 
represent the training ground for a large number of the Nation’s leaders, “[i]n order to cultivate a 
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership 
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our 
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational 
institutions that provide this training.” (Grutter, at 332). As Balkin points out, it is not clear 
whether Justice O’Connor means here that institutions should actually be fair and just, in order to 
be morally legitimate, or simply appear fair and just, in order to be seen as legitimate by the 
general public. (Balkin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter …”, at 1720-1721). 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
13Ringelheim – Reflections on the US Case Law on Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
 
the prior question: diversity for what purpose? The answer to this question is 
that we seek racial diversity in our student bodies and faculties because a 
central mission of the university must be the eradication of America’s 
racism.”
58 While there may be other reasons for promoting racial diversity in 
the academy, eliminating racism should be the primary one. “The diversity 
rationale is inseparable from the purpose of remedying our society’s 
racism.”
59 Indeed, the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in universities is 
significant precisely because it indicates that opportunities remain unequal.
60 
Uniformity signals the persistence of exclusionary processes that 
disproportionately affect the members of certain ethnic or racial groups.
61 
“While a racially diverse student body benefits everyone, what is really being 
sought through these admissions policies is access for racial minorities to 
institutions from which they have been and still are systematically and 
disproportionately excluded because of racism.”
62 Promoting diversity in 
higher education is not merely a matter of achieving educational goals. It is 
part of the broader objective of redressing the effects of past and present 
racism, and furthering the ability of all individuals to participate fully in the 
society.  
5. Conclusion 
The US case law on affirmative action in higher education demonstrates the 
ambivalence of the ‘diversity’ concept as a justification for special measures 
to enhance access of disadvantaged minority youths to universities. 
Ultimately, the goal of diversity alone, detached from a concern in advancing 
equality and social justice, appears insufficient to provide a compelling 
defence for considering racial or ethnic origins in the university admission 
process. An additional argument is needed, other than a striving for diversity 
as such.
63 This leads several commentators to argue that the objective of 
‘increasing diversity’ is merely a cover for a policy whose real aim is to 
promote equal opportunities for members of unjustly disadvantaged groups.
64 
It would serve to mask what is really at stake in affirmative action. The 
downside of this strategy is that the educational diversity rationale, if taken 
at face value, can spark new problems. One may adhere to the idea that a 
‘diverse student body’, with multiple viewpoints and experiences, fosters a 
stimulating learning environment, while contesting that ethnic or racial 
 
 
58   Lawrence III, “Each Other’s Harvest …”, at 765. 
59   Ibid., at 765. See also Jones, “The Diversity Rationale …”, at 179. 
60   Sher, “Diversity” …, at 94. 
61   Jones, “The Diversity Rationale …”, at 179. 
62   Ibid. 
63   See inter alia Levinson, “Diversity” …, at 601; Anderson, “Integration, Affirmative Action …”, at 
1222-1228; Sher, “Diversity” …, at 90.  
64   Sher, “Diversity” …, at 97; Balkin, “Plessy, Brown, and Grutter …”; Schuck, “Affirmative Action …”. 
See also Sabbagh, L’égalité par le droit …, at 363-382. 
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features are in any way relevant to this aim. Or one might claim that 
increasing racial or ethnic diversity does not actually result, in practice, in an 
improvement of the educational environment.  
This is not to say that the notion of diversity is inherently flawed. On the 
contrary, by emphasising the positive aspect of difference, it adds a valuable 
dimension to the ideal of equality. It is important, however, to be aware of its 
ambiguities and limitations. ‘Diversity’ as such is too vague a concept to 
provide a self-sufficient justification for special measures designed to 
promote minorities’ access to higher education. It must, therefore, remain 
closely articulated with the principles of equality and antidiscrimination. Only 
insofar as it is interpreted in the light of these fundamental goals, can it 
valuably contribute to the advancement of equal opportunities, inclusion and 
participation. 
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